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Abstract
We consider an efficiency-wage model with the Calvo-type sticky prices and analyze the optimal
monetary policy when the unemployment insurance is not perfect. With imperfect risk sharing,
the strict zero-inflation policy is no longer optimal even when the zero-inflation steady-state equi-
librium is made (conditionally) efficient. Quantitative results depend on how the idiosyncratic
earning loss due to unemployment varies over business cycles. If the idiosyncratic income loss is
acyclical, the optimal policy differs very little from the zero-inflation policy. However, if it varies
countercyclically, as evidence suggests, the deviation of the optimal policy from the complete price-
level stabilization becomes quantitatively significant. Furthermore, the optimal policy in such a
case involves stabilization of output to a much larger extent.
JEL Classification: E3; E5
Keywords: optimal monetary policy; efficiency wage; imperfect unemployment insurance; nominal
rigidities.
1. Introduction
There is a growing literature on optimal monetary policy based on the dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium framework with imperfect competition and staggered price-setting. Its simplest
version has two types of distortions: relative-price distortions due to staggered price-setting and
distortions associated with imperfect competition (market power). As discussed by Goodfriend
and King (1997), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Woodford (2003), if fiscal policy is used to
offset the distortions caused by market power, then the optimal monetary policy is characterized
as complete stabilization of the price level. Intuition is very simple: without distortions due to
market power, the flexible-price equilibrium becomes efficient, which, in turn, can be attained by
the zero-inflation policy.1 It is the price level that has to be stabilized, but not the level of output.2
As long as the inflation rate is kept at zero, any fluctuations in output would be efficient.
Email address: nakajima@kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp (Tomoyuki Nakajima)
1Note that this argument assumes that initial price dispersion is nil (or “small” if we are interested in a first-order
approximation of optimal monetary policy). See Yun (2005) on this point.
2What is stabilized is the “output gap,” which is defined as the difference between the actual level of output and
the efficient level of output.
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The basic model has been extended in several directions. For instance, Benigno and Woodford
(2003, 2005) and Khan, King and Wolman (2003) consider the case where distortions due to market
power are present. Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2005) extend the analysis further, by studying a even
richer model, based on Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005). The existing research on this
literature, however, has restricted attention to complete-markets (representative-agent) models.
In this paper we are interested to see the extent to which the nature of optimal monetary policy
is affected by the presence of unemployment when unemployment insurance is not perfect. In
particular, we’d like to examine whether or not the existence of imperfectly insured unemployed
workers calls for more output stabilization.
For this purpose, we bring unemployment into the basic sticky-price model, building on the
efficiency-wage model of Alexopoulos (2004). The model has a representative household with a
continuum of individual members. In each period, each member is either employed or unemployed.
An employed worker may or may not shirk. A detected shirker will be punished by an exogenous
reduction in the wage payment.3 Firms determine the wage rate so that no workers would shirk in
equilibrium. An important assumption that makes the model tractable is that individuals members
of a household are not allowed to participate in the asset market; it is the household that makes
all the decisions related to savings. Due to this assumption, we are able to use the representative-
household framework even though the unemployment insurance is not perfect. The rest of the
model is similar to the basic sticky-price model of Woodford (2003).
We analyze optimal monetary policy using the linear-quadratic approach developed by Rotem-
berg and Woodford (1997), Woodford (2003), and Benigno and Woodford (2003, 2005). To focus
on the effect of imperfect unemployment insurance on stabilization policy, we mostly assume that
fiscal policy is used to make the zero-inflation steady-state conditionally efficient. It follows that
with perfect insurance the flexible-price equilibrium is efficient so that the complete price-level
stabilization is the optimal policy. This is not true with imperfect insurance, so that the optimal
policy would involve some fluctuations in the inflation rate. Our qualitative analysis shows that a
government-purchase shock is a negative cost-push shock, while a productivity shock is a positive
one. That is, optimal policy should generate some deflation (inflation) when there is an exogenous
increase in government purchases (productivity).
But, quantitatively, how large is the deviation of the optimal policy from the complete price-
level stabilization? The answer crucially depends on how idiosyncratic income shocks vary over
business cycles. Specifically, what matters is how the relative income of the unemployed to that
of the employed varies over business cycle. We say that idiosyncratic income losses are acyclical
if the relative income of the unemployed is constant over business cycles and countercyclical if
it varies procyclically. We begin with the case where the relative income of the unemployed is
constant over business cycles. In this case, although the complete price-level stabilization is not
exactly optimal with imperfect insurance, the optimal policy differs very little from it. Thus, as
long as idiosyncratic income losses are acyclical, the optimal policy essentially takes the form of
3A relation with the model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) is discussed in Appendix.
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the complete price-level stabilization. This is so even though the unemployment rate goes up in a
recession.
Evidence seems to suggest, however, that idiosyncratic shocks are countercyclical. In particular,
earning losses of unemployed or displaced workers are found to be countercyclical (e.g., Jacobson,
LaLonde and Sullivan, 1993). To take it into account, our second numerical exercise assumes that
the relative income of the unemployed varies procyclically over business cycles. In this case, the
deviation of the optimal policy from the zero-inflation policy becomes much larger. Furthermore,
the optimal policy under countercyclical idiosyncratic income losses involves stabilization of the
level of output, much more so compared to the case where idiosyncratic income losses are acyclical.
Intuition is simple: if a bad shock to the economy worsens uninsured idiosyncratic shocks and makes
the unemployed more miserable, policy should respond to reduce the number of unemployment,
which is to increase the level of output.
Our numerical exercise suggests that the mere existence of imperfectly insured unemployed
workers may not justify output stabilization, for which there need to be systematic variation in the
idiosyncratic risk over business cycles. An important limitation of our model is that idiosyncratic
shocks are purely transitory. Evidence such as Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004) suggests,
however, that idiosyncratic shocks are highly persistent as well as countercyclical. Based on a non-
monetary growth model, Krebs (2007) demonstrates that the welfare cost of business cycles can
be sizable with such idiosyncratic shocks. Analyzing optimal policy with persistent idiosyncratic
shocks is left for future research.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the model economy is described. In Section 3 the
efficient allocation and the flexible-price equilibrium are discussed. In Section 4 a linear-quadratic
approximation of the model is derived. In Section 5 optimal monetary policy is examined in the
case where the degree of risk sharing is constant over business cycles. Section 6 considers the case
where the degree of risk sharing fluctuates cyclically. There, we also extend our analysis to the
case where the non-stochastic steady state is inefficient. Concluding remarks are in Section 7.
2. The model economy
In this section we describe our model economy. Its key features are staggered price setting
and unemployment. Our model builds on Woodford (2003) for the former and the efficiency-wage
model of Alexopoulos (2004) for the latter. Alexopoulos’s model differs from the well known
model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) in that a detected shirker is punished by a reduction in
the wage rate, rather than by getting fired. Nevertheless, as discussed in Appendix, it becomes
observationally equivalent to the Shapiro-Stiglitz model with a particular unemployment insurance
program. Indeed, we find it very convenient that Alexopoulos’s model can be made observationally
equivalent to the standard indivisible-labor model of Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988), or to
the Shapiro-Stiglitz model, depending on the assumed unemployment insurance program.
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2.1. Households
There is a representative household which has a continuum of individual members of unit
measure. In each period, randomly selected Nt individuals receive job offers. The rest, 1 − Nt,
are unemployed.4 All employed workers work for a fixed length of hours, h. An employed worker,
however, may or may not shirk. A shirker is a worker whose effort level is different from that
required by her employer, et.5
The utility flow of an employed individual who consumes C and exerts an effort level e is given
by
U(C, e) = lnC + ω ln(H− he), (1)
where ω,H > 0 are constant parameters, and C is the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of differentiated










Given the prices of differentiated products, p(i), i ∈ [0, 1], the standard cost-minimization argument














, i ∈ [0, 1].
The utility flow of an unemployed individual is given by U(C, 0).
An important assumption we make for tractability is that individual members of a household are
not allowed to participate in the asset market (they cannot save or borrow individually). Instead,
it is the household that participates in the asset market, where it trades Arrow securities for
aggregate shocks with the government.6 In addition, the household receives (nominal) dividends
from the firms, Πt(i), i ∈ [0, 1]; and pays (nominal) lump sum taxes to the government, Tt. The
flow budget constraint of the household is then given by
It + Et[Qt,t+1At+1] = At +
∫ 1
0
Πt(i) di− Tt, (2)
where It is the “income” distributed equally across the household members, At+1 denotes the
trading in Arrow securities and Qt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor used to evaluate the value
4We assume that whether or not each individual receives a job offer is observable and that a person who turns
down the job offer loses the eligibility for unemployment benefits. Then as long as the unemployment-insurance fee
is not too large, no one would turn down a job offer.
5As we shall see, the required level of effort will be the same for all firms.
6Note that, although there is only partial insurance against idiosyncratic risk of getting unemployed, there is a
complete asset market for aggregate shocks.
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Here, Qt,t+j is the stochastic discount factor used to evaluate date-t+ j nominal income at date t,
which is defined recursively as
Qt,t+j = Qt,t+j−1Qt+j−1,t+j , j ≥ 1,
with Qt,t ≡ 1.
With lump-sum transfer It from the household, the date-t consumption of an employed indi-
vidual who is not detected shirking, Ce,t, is given by
PtCe,t = It + hWt −UIft , (4)
where Wt is the nominal wage rate, and UI
f
t is the unemployment-insurance fee. A shirker is
caught with probability d ∈ (0, 1). A detected shirker receives only a fraction s ∈ [0, 1) of the
wage. Both s and d are constant, exogenous parameters. The date-t consumption of a detected
shirker, Cs,t, becomes
PtCs,t = It + shWt −UIft . (5)
Given this, a shirker would always choose e = 0. Finally, the level of consumption of an unemployed
is given as
PtCu,t = It +UIbt , (6)
where UIbt denotes unemployment benefits.
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The objective of the household is to maximize the average utility of its members. As we shall
see, firms set the wage rate, Wt, and the required level of effort, et, so that employed workers never






NtU(Ce,t, et) + (1−Nt)U(Cu,t, 0)
]
(7)
Taking as given A0 and {Nt, et, Pt, Qt,t+1, Tt,UIft ,UIbt ,Wt,Πt(i); i ∈ [0, 1], t ≥ 0}, the household
chooses {It,At+1; t ≥ 0} so as to maximize the average utility (7) subject to (2), (3), (4), (6).





Nt+1UC(Ce,t+1, et+1) + (1−Nt+1)UC(Cu,t+1, 0)
NtUC(Ce,t, et) + (1−Nt)UC(Cu,t, 0)
Notice that the marginal rate of substitution involves the average marginal utilities. The transver-




7Our assumption that It is distributed equally between employed and unemployed members of the household
may be justified by imposing the information restriction that individuals cannot communicate with the household
after their employment status is known. I thank a referee for this interpretation.
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2.2. Firms
2.2.1. No shirking condition









eth(nt − nst )
] 1
φ ,
where φ ≥ 1, At is the economy-wide productivity shock, et is the level of effort required by the
firm, nt and nst are the numbers of employed and of shirkers, respectively. Given this production
technology, having shirkers would never be profitable for firms. Each firm offers an employment
contract, {et,Wt}, to its employed. As the following argument shows, all firms offer the same
contract, so that the index of firms, i, is omitted here.
Because a shirker is detected with probability d, no workers in a given firm would shirk if
U(Ce,t, et) ≥ (1− d)U(Ce,t, 0) + dU(Cs,t, 0).
Given that Ce,t and Cs,t are determined as in (4) and (5), the incentive-compatible level of effort
must satisfy





shWt + It −UIft




where the firm take It, UIft as given.
The cost minimization problem of the firm is then given by
min
Wt,nt
Wtnt s.t. Atf(ethnt) ≥ yt, and et ≤ e(Wt). (8)









where e and 0 < χw < 1 are constants defined in Appendix. As we shall discuss below, the
equilibrium wage rate in (9) is inefficient unless unemployment insurance is perfect.
2.2.2. Calvo pricing























= (1− τ)pt(i)yt(i)− hnt(i)Wt






















Following Calvo (1983), we assume that only a fraction (1− α) of randomly selected firms can
reset their prices in each period. The rest of firms simply charge the same prices as in the previous
period. Thus, if firm i receives the opportunity of resetting its product price in period t, it chooses








In this model, all firms which reset prices in the same period choose the same price.8 Let p∗t denote











where st,T is the real marginal cost in period T of those firms that reset their prices in period t,
and




The government conducts monetary and fiscal policy. The flow budget constraint for the
government is
Tt + τPtYt +NtUI
f
t + Et[Qt,t+1At+1] = At + PtGt + (1−Nt)UIbt ,
where At+1 denotes the state-contingent debt issued by the government and A0 is given.
We assume a very simple form of fiscal policy. The government takes as given τ , UIft , UI
b
t , Gt,
as well as Pt, Nt, and Yt. Fiscal policy sets Tt in the “Ricardian” way (Woodford, 1995) so that
we do not need specify the details of the conduct of fiscal policy. Monetary policy is formulated
as in Woodford (2003, Chapter 7), Benigno and Woodford (2003, 2005), among others. Thus,
optimal monetary policy is implicitly defined as the solution to the (adequately modified version
of) Ramsey problem. With a linear-quadratic approximation, in particular, monetary policy is to
set a state-contingent path of inflation rates.
8An implicit assumption here is that each firm possesses the same, constant amount of firm-specific capital. If we
allow for accumulation of such capital, the price chosen by a firm would depend on the amount of capital it holds.
See Woodford (2005) for such a model.
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2.4. Exogenous variables
The unemployment-insurance fee, UIft , is assumed to remain small enough that no worker with
a job offer would turn it down. Specifically, given that U(Ce, e) = U(Cs, 0) in equilibrium and that
a worker who turns down a job offer is not eligible for unemployment benefits, a job offer would
never be rejected if PtCs,t ≥ It, that is, if
UIft ≤ shWt,
which is assumed to hold throughout this paper.





hWt + It −UIft
.
If unemployment insurance is perfect, Bt = 1; otherwise, Bt < 1. Let Ct be the aggregate level of
consumption:
Ct ≡ NtCe,t + (1−Nt)Cu,t.
The goods-market equilibrium condition is given by
Yt = Ct +Gt, (14)
where Gt is government purchases. The levels of consumption of the employed and the unemployed
are expressed respectively as
Ce,t =
1
Nt + (1−Nt)BtCt, (15)
Cu,t =
Bt
Nt + (1−Nt)BtCt. (16)
The unemployment insurance program is run with balanced budget: NtUI
f
t = (1 − Nt)UIbt .
Note that here unemployment insurance affects equilibrium only through its effect on Bt. In our
benchmark analysis, we assume for simplicity that the unemployment benefits (and fees) in each
period are determined so that this ratio remains constant:
Bt = B¯ ∈ (0, 1], for all t.
We later relax this assumption in Section 6 and let this ratio, Bt, fluctuate procyclically over time.
In the benchmark case, there are two stochastic shocks: the government-purchase shock, Gt,
and the productivity shock, At. Assume that they take the form:
Gt = sGY¯ eξG,t , and At = A¯eξA,t ,
where sG ∈ (0, 1), Y¯ is the steady-state level of output, and {ξG,t, ξA,t} follows a stationary
stochastic process with unconditional mean of zero. Let ξt denote the vector of these exogenous
disturbances:
ξt = (ξG,t, ξA,t).
When Bt is allowed to fluctuate, we let Bt = B¯eξB,t , and ξt = (ξG,t, ξA,t, ξB,t).
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3. Efficient allocation and flexible-price equilibrium
In this section we first rewrite the household’s utility in terms of aggregate output and a
measure of output dispersion across firms. A key finding is that the less risk sharing is, the less
concave the household’s utility is in aggregate output. Then we consider the efficient allocation
given the exogenous shocks: Gt and At. Here, efficiency is defined conditional on that the level
of effort equals the equilibrium level, e, and that unemployment insurance is limited by B¯. We
shall also derive the flexible-price equilibrium. It provides a useful benchmark, because, to a first-
order approximation, the level of output in the flexible-price equilibrium coincides with that in a
sticky-price equilibrium with zero inflation.
3.1. Utility flow of the household
Using (14)-(16), the flow utility of the household (i.e., the average utility flow of its members)
is given by












− ω[ln(H)− ln(H− he)]Nt + ln(H),
= ln(Yt −Gt) + z(Nt; B¯)− ω
[
ln(H)− ln(H− he)]Nt + ln(H), (17)
where
z(N ;B) ≡ (1−N) lnB − ln[N + (1−N)B].
The function z(N ;B) represents the inefficiency caused by imperfect risk sharing, B. If B = 1,
z(N ; 1) = 0 for all N , so that the flow utility of the household takes the same form as in the
indivisible labor model of Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988):
Wt = ln(Yt −Gt)− ω
[
ln(H)− ln(H− he)]Nt + ln(H).
When B < 1, z(N ;B) has a minimum at N = N(B), where




and is increasing in N for N > N(B) and decreasing in N for N < N(B). In what follows, we
focus on the case where Nt > 1/2 holds almost surely for all t. Note also that the function z(N ;B)
is convex in N . Therefore, imperfect risk sharing makes the household’s objective function less
concave.







































di ≥ 1. (19)
where the inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality.
Using this, the flow utility of the household can be expressed as a function of Yt, ∆t, and
exogenous disturbances:
W(Yt,∆t; ξt) = U(Yt;Gt) + Z(Yt,∆;At, B¯)− V (Yt,∆t;At) + ln(H), (20)
where
U(Y ;G) ≡ ln(Y −G), (21)
Z(Y,∆;A,B) ≡ z[N(Y,∆;A);B], (22)
V (Y,∆;A) = ω
[
ln(H)− ln(H− he)]N(Y,∆;A) (23)
Since N(Y,∆;A) is convex in Y , so is Z(Y,∆;A,B). Hence imperfect unemployment insurance,
B¯ < 1, makes the objective function of the household less concave relative to the case of perfect
insurance. That is, ceteris paribus, the household tends to be willing to accept larger fluctuations
in output when risk sharing is not perfect. This property plays an important role in determining
the character of optimal monetary policy in our model. Throughout this paper we assume that
Z(Y,∆;A,B) is not so convex that W(Y,∆; ξ) is strictly concave in Y and ∆ for each ξ.
Assumption 1. For each ξ, W(Y,∆; ξ) is strictly concave in Y and ∆.
3.2. Efficient rate of output
The efficient allocation is the feasible allocation that maximizes the expected discounted sum
of the household’s average utility flows, {Wt}, in (20). This Pareto problem has no predetermined
variables and can be solved state by state in a static fashion. For each ξt, the efficient allocation,




where Yt is given by (11). Under our assumption, it is straightforward to see that there is no
output dispersion in the efficient allocation:
y∗t (i) = Y
∗
t , and ∆
∗
t = 1,
and that the efficient level of aggregate output satisfies the first-order condition:
UY (Y ∗t ;Gt) + ZY (Y
∗
t , 1;At, B¯) = VY (Y
∗
t , 1;At). (24)




Thus lower risk sharing (lower B¯) raises the efficient level of output. This is because less risk
sharing makes unemployment more costly, and hence the efficient level of unemployment is lower,
which implies that the efficient level of output is higher.
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3.3. Flexible price equilibrium
Here we consider the flexible-price equilibrium, in which each firm can change its product price
freely in every period. The flexible-price equilibrium defines the “natural rates” of endogenous
variables, which are denoted by superscript n.






In the symmetric equilibrium, all firms charge the same price, pt(i) = Pt, which yields
st(i) = 1− Φ, ∀i ∈ [0, 1]. (26)











Using (9), (21) and (23), condition (26) can be expressed as
χ(1− Φ)UY (Y nt ;Gt)D(Y nt ;At, B¯)−1 = VY (Y nt , 1;At), (27)
where χ is the constant defined by
χ ≡ ω[ln(H)− ln(H− he)]
χw
The natural rate of output, Y nt , is defined implicitly in (27).
As shown in Appendix, in contrast with the case of the efficient rate of output (25), the natural




This is because, other things being equal, an increase in risk sharing tends to reduce the amount
of consumption of the employed due to a rise in the unemployment-insurance fee. As shown in
equation (9), a decline in consumption of the employed, in turn, lowers the wage rate and hence
increases production.
4. Linear-quadratic approximation
We wish to characterize the optimal monetary policy using the linear-quadratic approach devel-
oped by Woodford (2003) and Benigno and Woodford (2003, 2005). In that approach, the monetary
authority maximizes a quadratic approximation of the utility of the representative household sub-
ject to a log-linear approximation of the aggregate supply relation. Each approximation is taken
around the zero-inflation steady state.
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With the Calvo pricing, the price index, Pt, evolves as
Pt =
[
(1− α)p∗ 1−θt + αP 1−θt−1
] 1
1−θ , (29)










where Πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1 is the gross rate of inflation in period t. Similarly, the evolution of the price















Using (30), we obtain






+ αΠθφt ∆t−1 (31)
Consider the zero-inflation steady state, that is, the equilibrium in which ξt = 0 and Πt = 1,
for all t. In what follows, the value of each variable at the zero-inflation steady state is denoted
by a bar. Equation (31) implies that ∆t = 1, all t. The first-order condition (13) reduces to
st(i) = 1−Φ, for all i, which implies that the level of output at the zero-inflation steady state, Y¯ ,
is the solution to
χ(1− Φ)UY (Y¯ ; G¯)D(Y¯ ; A¯, B¯)−1 = VY (Y¯ , 1; A¯)
We assume that the zero-inflation steady-state equilibrium is (conditionally) efficient.
Assumption 2. The tax rate on monopoly revenue, τ , is set so that the level of output in the
zero-inflation steady state is efficient:
Y¯ = Y¯ ∗
Whether or not unemployment insurance is perfect, imperfect competition would cause inef-
ficiency at the steady state. How such inefficiency affects the optimal equilibrium path has been
analyzed, for instance, by Khan, King and Wolman (2003) and Benigno and Woodford (2003,
2005). With Assumption 2, we can focus on the inefficiency that imperfect unemployment insur-
ance introduces outside the steady state.
As shown in Appendix, a log-linear approximation of first-order condition (13) for p∗t is given
by
pit = κxt + βEtpit+1 + ut. (32)
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Here xt is the (welfare-relevant) output gap:
xt ≡ Yˆt − Yˆ ∗t ,
ut is the “cost-push shock,” defined by
ut ≡ κ(Yˆ ∗t − Yˆ nt ),
and κ is the constant defined by
κ ≡ (1− α)(1− αβ)
α
σ−1 − δ + φ− 1
1 + (φ− 1)θ ,
where σ−1 and δ are the elasticities of UY and D−1 with respect to Y evaluated at the zero-inflation
steady state:









N¯ + (1− N¯)B¯ ≥ 0.
Note that δ = 0 with perfect insurance. It immediately follows that imperfect insurance makes κ
smaller. In other words, the real effect of a nominal shock is larger with imperfect insurance.
Proposition 1. Imperfect insurance makes the coefficient κ in the AS relation (32) smaller:
κ|B¯<1 < κ|B¯=1.






















1 + (φ− 1)θ]
(1− α)(1− αβ) (1− Γ),
qy ≡ σ−1(1− Γ)− ζΓ + φ− 1.
Here, ζ and Γ are constants defined by
ζ ≡ ZY Y Y¯
ZY
≥ 0, Γ ≡ ZY
UY + ZY
∈ [0, 1],
where all derivatives are evaluated at the zero-inflation steady state. From (32) and (33), it follows
that the exogenous shocks relevant for the optimal policy problem are summarized into a single
composite variable, ut.
5. Optimal policy with constant risk sharing
In the traditional (Ramsey) approach, the optimal policy problem, say at date t0, is to choose
a state-contingent path, {pit, xt}t≥t0 , so as to maximize the household’s utility (33) subject to the
13
aggregate-supply relation (32) for t ≥ t0. As is well known, this type of optimization fails to be time
consistent: if the planner is allowed to reoptimize at a future date, it will choose a different path
of inflation and output gap. Concerning this issue, Woodford (2003) and Benigno and Woodford
(2003, 2005) have shown that the optimal policy problem can be modified into a recursive form with
an additional constraint, which is to allow the planner to make a commitment for one period. The
solution to such a constrained policy problem is called optimal policy from a timeless perspective.
Specifically, in the linear-quadratic problem here, the modified policy problem at any date t0 is to
choose a state-contingent path, {pit, xt}t≥t0 , so as to maximize the household’s utility subject to
the aggregate-supply relation as well as to the commitment from the previous period of the form:
pit0 = p¯it0 .
Following Woodford (2003) and others, we shall consider the policy problem constrained in this
fashion. Note, however, that it yields the same impulse responses to exogenous disturbances as
the traditional, unconstrained policy problem (Woodford, 2003, Proposition 7.9).









Substituting into (32), we obtain the second-order difference equation in ϕt:
βqyEtϕt+1 −
[
(1 + β)qy + κ2qpi
]
ϕt + qyϕt−1 = qpiqyut. (36)
Its characteristic equation,
βqyµ
2 − [(1 + β)qy + κ2qpi]µ+ qy = 0,
has a solution pair, µ ∈ (0, 1) and 1/(βµ) > 1. It follows that a bounded solution to (36) takes the
form of




where ϕt0−1 satisfies the initial condition: ϕt0−1 − ϕt0 = qpip¯it0 . Given {ϕt}, the optimal state-
contingent evolution of pit and xt are derived using (34)-(35).
Equations (34), (35) and (37) tell us how the optimal state-contingent paths of pit and xt
depend on the composite shock, ut = κ(Yˆ ∗t − Yˆ nt ). For example, consider impulse responses to
a cost-push shock in period t. To be specific, suppose that ut follows an AR(1) process given by
ut = ρuut−1+ ²u,t where ρu ∈ (−1, 1) and ²u,t is i.i.d. with zero mean. Equation (37) implies that
ϕt+j = µϕt+j−1 + φuut+j ,
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where φu ≡ −µqpi/(1−βµρu). It follows that impulse responses at dates t+ j, j = 0, 1, . . ., become
Etϕt+j − Et−1ϕt+j = µ
j+1 − ρj+1u
µ− ρu φu²u,t













φu²u,t, for j = 0
1
qpi
µj(1− µ)− ρju(1− ρu)
µ− ρu φu²u,t, for j ≥ 1
To see now how ut depends on the fundamental shocks, log-linearize the first-order conditions
(24) and (27) around the zero-inflation steady state:












φ− Γ(ζ + 1)
σ−1(1− Γ)− ζΓ + φ− 1 (40)
c∗G ≡
σ−1(1− Γ)sG
σ−1(1− Γ)− ζΓ + φ− 1 > 0 (41)
cnA ≡
φ− δ
σ−1 − δ + φ− 1 > 0 (42)
cnG ≡
σ−1sG
σ−1 − δ + φ− 1 > 0 (43)
Given this, we can express the cost push shock as
ut = cuAξA,t + c
u
GξG,t,
where cus ≡ κ(c∗s − cns ), for s = A,G.
5.1. Effects of imperfect insurance: Theoretical results
Optimal policy involves strict price-level stabilization (zero inflation), if the flexible-price equi-
librium is optimal so that Yˆ nt = Yˆ
∗
t and ut = 0. It is obviously the case when the unemployment
insurance is perfect: B¯ = 1. It is also the case when there are no government purchases in the
steady state, sG = 0. This is due to our homothetic preferences, as is discussed in Benigno and
Woodford (2005). The following proposition summarizes.
9If inequality (44) below holds, c∗A > 0.
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In general, the flexible-price equilibrium is not efficient outside the steady state, that is, Y nt 6=
Y ∗t , in spite of Assumption 2. Given the first-order conditions (24) and (27), the elasticities of
UY + ZY and UYD−1 with respect to Y are important in determining the nature of optimal
monetary policy. At the zero-inflation steady state, those elasticities are given by
−UY Y Y + ZY Y Y
UY + ZY






= σ−1 − δ ≤ σ−1
With B¯ = 1, they are both equal to σ−1 since δ = Γ = 0. Thus, imperfect insurance makes
both UY + ZY and UYD−1 less elastic with respect to Y . The former follows from the fact that
imperfect insurance makes the aggregate utility less concave. The latter follows from the fact that
an increase in Y raises Ce less than C, because it reduces unemployment (this effect is reflected in
the term D−1). As the next proposition states, this property implies that the response of Y ∗t and
Y nt to an exogenous shift in Gt is larger with imperfect insurance than with perfect insurance.
Proposition 3. Assume that sG > 0. The responses of Y ∗t and Y nt to Gt are larger with imperfect
insurance than with perfect insurance:
c∗G|B¯=1 < c∗G|B¯<1,
cnG|B¯=1 < cnG|B¯<1.
In other words, imperfect insurance makes the efficient and natural rates of output more volatile
in response to a “demand shock.” The opposite is true for the response to a “supply shock,” At.
Proposition 4. Assume that sG > 0. The responses of Y ∗t and Y
n
t to At are smaller with imperfect
insurance than with perfect insurance:
c∗A|B¯<1 < c∗A|B¯=1,
cnA|B¯<1 < cnA|B¯=1.
With perfect insurance, the efficient (and the natural) rate of output is determined by the
equation UY = VY , where the left-hand side expresses the marginal benefit of increasing Y and
the right-hand side its marginal cost. An increase in productivity, A, lowers the marginal cost but
does not affect the marginal benefit, and hence raises the efficient rate of output. With imperfect
insurance, this effect is partially offset because A lowers ZY and D−1.
Whether G and A are positive or negative cost push shocks depends on the elasticities of
UY +ZY and UYD−1. The following lemma provides a necessary and sufficient condition that the
former is greater than the latter.
Lemma 1.
σ−1(1− Γ)− ζΓ > σ−1 − δ > 0 (44)
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if and only if σ−1 − δ > 0 and
(σ−1 − δ)[2δ + ln(B¯)Nφ] > (φ− 1)[− ln(B¯)Nφ− δ]
Condition (44) holds if φ = 1 and B¯ ∈ (0.21, 1). Indeed, it is satisfied for all the numerical
exercises we have considered, and hence, we shall restrict our attention to such a case.
Proposition 5. Assume that sG > 0, B¯ < 1 and (44) holds. Then the government-purchase
shock, G, is a negative cost-push shock and the productivity shock, A, is a positive cost-push shock:
cuG < 0, and c
u
A > 0.
The following proposition shows how imperfect insurance affects the persistence parameter µ
of optimal policy.
Proposition 6. Under condition (44), imperfect insurance makes the persistence parameter µ in
(37) larger:
µ|B¯=1 < µ|B¯<1.
5.2. Effects of imperfect insurance: Quantitative results
We have seen that the exact zero-inflation policy is not optimal if the unemployment insurance
is not perfect. Here we examine quantitatively how much optimal policy differs from the complete
price-level stabilization. Assume that the exogenous disturbances, ξA,t and ξG,t, follow the AR(1)
process given by ξA,t = ρAξA,t−1 + ²A,t and ξG,t = ρGξG,t−1 + ²G,t, where ²A,t and ²G,t are i.i.d.
random variables with mean zero. In the numerical exercise below, we set α = 0.66, β = 0.99
(the time unit is a quarter), φ = 1.47, θ = 10, which are in accordance with the parameter values
assumed in Woodford (2003, Table 5.1). In addition we assume sG = 0.2 and N¯ = 0.94. Different
values are examined for B¯, ρA and ρG.
Figures 1-4 plot optimal responses of pit, xt ≡ Yˆt − Yˆ ∗t , and Yˆt to the productivity and
government-purchase shocks, for different values of B¯, ρA, and ρG.10 We set the size of the
initial innovation to the two shocks as ²A,0 = −2.34% and ²G,0 = −13.76%, both of which reduce
the efficient level of output by 2 percent, Yˆ ∗0 = −2%, in the case of B¯ = 1 and ρA = ρG = 0. The
inflation rate is expressed as an annual rate in percentage points and the output gap and the level
of output are expressed in percentage deviations from their steady state values.
***Figures 1-2 are around here.***
In Figures 1-2, shocks are serially uncorrelated, ρA = ρG = 0, and different degrees of risk
sharing are considered: B¯ = 0.5, 0.75, 1.0. Consistent with the theoretical results above, the
10Specifically, those figures plot E0pit − E−1pit etc. for t = 0, 1, . . . , 8.
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exact price stabilization is optimal in the case of perfect insurance (B¯ = 1), and the less risk
sharing is (the lower B¯ is), the more the optimal policy differs from the complete price-level
stabilization. Consistent with Propositions 3-4, less insurance makes optimal responses of output to
the government-purchase shock (the productivity shock) larger (smaller). However, quantitatively,
the optimal policy may not be distinguishable from the complete price-level stabilization. Figures
1-2 show that even when B¯ is as low as 0.5, the optimal policy generates almost no inflation or
deflation and lets output decline by about 2 percent.
***Figures 3-4 are around here.***
We have seen that, quantitatively, the steady-state level of risk sharing, B¯, does not matter
much. In what follows we set our benchmark value of B¯ to 0.75. We have chosen this value
following Alexopoulos (2004), who set B¯ = 0.78 based on the evidence in Gruber (1997).11 We
next examine the effects of the persistence of each shock. In Figures 3-4, we plot the optimal policy
responses when ρA and ρG are 0.9, respectively (B¯ = 0.75). As the persistence of a shock becomes
greater, the optimal responses to it involve larger fluctuations in the inflation rate and the output
gap. However, these figures show again that, regardless of the values of ρA and ρG, deviations
of the optimal policy from the complete price-level stabilization is quantitatively very small. We
thus conclude that, as far as the degree of risk sharing is constant, imperfect risk sharing does not
have quantitatively significant impact on the optimal policy, and the optimal policy is essentially
characterized by the price-level stabilization.
6. Optimal policy with countercyclical idiosyncratic shocks
We have so far focused on the case where the degree of risk sharing is constant, Bt = B¯. In our
model, Bt is the relative income level of the unemployed to the employed, and hence, it measures
the earning loss that workers experience when they get unemployed. According to the evidence
such as Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993), such earning loss fluctuates countercyclically, i.e.,
Bt fluctuates procyclically.12 In this section we shall see that the optimal policy would involve
much larger fluctuations in inflation if Bt fluctuates procyclically.
11Although B¯ does not matter much in our model, it may well play an important role in other contexts. For
instance, the results by Shimer (2005) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) show that the value of non-market
activity, which might correspond to B¯ in our model, significantly affects the cyclical properties of the labor search
model. Hagedorn and Manovskii show that the standard search model does much better if we set B¯ = 0.95, as
opposed to the value chosen by Shimer (2005), which is, B¯ = 0.4.
12More broadly, Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004) show evidence that the idiosyncratic income risk fluctuates
countercyclically.
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6.1. Optimal responses to a negative insurance shock
With time-varying Bt = B¯ exp(ξB,t), the efficient and the natural rates of output are given,
respectively, as




















G are as given in (40)-(43), and
c∗B ≡
1
σ−1(1− Γ)− ζΓ + φ− 1
φ(1− B¯)N¯ [(1− N¯)2B¯ − N¯2]
[σ−1 − ln(B¯)N¯φ− δ][(1− B¯)N¯ + B¯]2
cnB ≡
1
σ−1 − δ + φ− 1
(1− N¯)B¯
N¯ + (1− N¯)B¯
It follows from equations (25) and (28) that cnB > 0 and c
∗
B < 0. Hence Bt is a negative cost-push
shock.
Proposition 7. The insurance shock, Bt, is a negative cost-push shock:
cuB < 0.
***Figure 5 is around here.***
The intuition of this result is simple. A higher Bt reduces the efficient level of output, Y ∗t ,
because it reduces the inequality between the employed and the unemployed and hence raises
the efficient rate of unemployment. On the other hand, an increase in Bt raises the natural rate
of output, Y nt , because it reduces the consumption of the employed, C
e
t , and hence reduces the
marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption of the employed (and the wage
rate), which raises the level of output in the flexible-price equilibrium. Figure 5 plots the optimal
responses to a negative insurance shock at date 0: B0 = 0.65 and Bt = 0.75 for t 6= 0. It shows
that in response to such a shock, the optimal polity raises both inflation and output significantly.
6.2. Optimal responses with cyclical Bt
Now let us examine quantitatively how cyclical fluctuations in Bt affects the optimal policy.
Specifically, we shall consider the impulse responses of the optimal policy to a decline in At or Gt,
assuming that such negative shocks to the economy accompany a decrease in Bt (an increase in
the earning loss of the unemployed).
We consider the same size of the initial innovations to the productivity and government-purchase
shock as in the previous figures: ²A,0 = −2.34% and ²G,0 = −13.76%. Also, the steady-state level
of risk sharing is given by B¯ = 0.75 and that shocks are serially uncorrelated: ρA = ρG = 0. Here,
however, we assume that those negative shocks arrive with a temporary decline in the degree of
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risk sharing: B0 = 0.65. It returns to the steady state level after one period: Bt = B¯ for t ≥ 1.
Note that such a decline in Bt (from B¯ = 0.75 to B0 = 0.65) seems to be empirically plausible.
For instance, based on various empirical work, Krebs (2007) assumes that the difference in the
earnings losses of displaced workers between booms and recessions is 12 percent in his numerical
analysis.
***Figures 6-7 are around here.***
In Figures 6-7, the solid lines describe the impulse response functions of the optimal policy for
those composite shocks. For comparison, the dotted lines show the case with constant Bt. As we
have already seen, with constant risk sharing, the optimal policy is essentially characterized as the
complete price-level stabilization. For instance, when Bt ≡ 0.75, ²A,0 = −2.34% leads to pi0 =
−0.0063 percent. As we know from Figure 1, even with Bt ≡ 0.5, pi0 = −0.011 percent. However,
if B0 moves together with ²A,0, then optimal policy involves much larger responses of the inflation
rate: when B0 = 0.65 = B¯ − 0.1, pi0 = 0.25%. Similarly, such countercyclical income losses of the
unemployed imply much larger responses of the output gap, x0 = Yˆ0 − Yˆ ∗0 (x0 = 0.013%,−0.53%
for B0 = B¯, B¯ − 0.1, respectively). It is also noteworthy that countercyclical idiosyncratic income
shock calls for more stabilization of the actual level of output, Yˆt: Yˆ0 = −1.966%,−0.29% for
B0 = B¯, B¯ − 0.1, respectively. Figure 7 illustrates that optimal responses to the government-
purchase shock share similar properties.
We find it interesting that the actual level of output, Yˆt, is stabilized quite strongly under
optimal policy when the degree of risk sharing, Bt, fluctuates cyclically. In the case where B0
declines to 0.65, the optimal responses of pi0 and Yˆ0 are in similar magnitude. There are two
reasons for this. First, although negative shocks ²A,0 and ²G,0 tend to reduce the efficient level of
output, Y ∗0 , the deterioration in risk sharing calls for stimulation of the economy and hence tends
to raise the efficient level of output. These two forces offset each other so that Yˆ ∗0 is close to zero
and the equilibrium level of output is stabilized under optimal policy. Second, fluctuations in the
inflation rate and the output gap are larger with cyclical Bt because its quantitative impact on the
cost push shock, ut, is large, which, in turn, is the result that a shock to risk sharing affects the
efficient and natural levels of output in the opposite directions (recall that cnB > 0 and c
∗
B < 0).
6.3. Extension to the case with distorted steady state
So far we have maintained the assumption that the non-stochastic steady state is efficient
(Assumption 2). Here, we relax this assumption and see that our basic result extends to the
case with distorted steady state. For this purpose, we choose to follow the approach taken by
Khan, King and Wolman (2003), that is, linearizing the first-order conditions for the optimal
policy problem (the “Ramsey” problem), rather than the linear-quadratic approach of Benigno
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and Woodford (2003, 2005), which we have taken so far.13






where v is the marginal disutility of labor supply: v ≡ ω[ln(H)−ln(H−he)]. The Ramsey problem
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+ αpiθφt ∆t−1 (51)
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier on the flow budget constraint in the household’s utility max-
imization problem. Here, equation (45) is the first-order condition with respect to Ce,t in the
household’s utility maximization problem; (46) is the goods market clearing condition; (47)-(49)
describe the profit-maximization condition under the Calvo pricing; (50) is the aggregate produc-
tion technology; and (51) defines the relative-price distortion ∆t. Note that the policy maker
here takes as given the sticky-price distortion, the efficiency-wage distortion, the imperfectness of
the unemployment insurance, and the monopoly distortion. In this sense, this is the second-best
problem.
***Figure 8 is around here.***
We have used Dynare to solve this problem numerically.14 We conduct the same exercise as
in Figure 6 except that the steady state is no longer efficient. Specifically, we set the parameter
13As shown by Benigno and Woodford (2003, 2005), one could obtain a quadratic approximation to the social
welfare function even when the steady state is distorted. However, as argued by Angeletos (2003), the quadratic
approximation obtained in such a case tends to be too complicated to interpret. For this reason, we find it better
here not to pursue their approach.
14Dynare is a suite of programs for estimation and simulation of DSGE models, which was originally developed
by Michel Juillard. It is available at http://www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/dynare/.
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values so that the natural rate of output is 90 percent of the efficient rate of output in the steady
state. The solid lines in Figure 8 plot the optimal response of inflation and output to a temporary
decline in the productivity that accompanies a decline in the degree of risk sharing Bt (B0 = 0.65
and Bt = 0.75 for t 6= 0 as in Figure 6). For comparison, the dashed lines depict the case where Bt
is constant.15 We can see that our basic results remain to hold when the steady state is distorted:
the inflation rate responds much more and output is stabilized to a larger extent when the degree
of risk sharing fluctuates cyclically.
6.4. Second moment properties
In order to further examine the effect of cyclical fluctuations in Bt on the optimal policy, let us
investigate the second-moment properties of the model. For comparison, we consider a Taylor-rule
policy as well as the Ramsey (or optimal) policy. The Taylor rule we consider is given by
ln(Rt) = ln(R¯) + αpi ln(pit)
where Rt is the nominal interest rate. We set R¯ so that the inflation rate is zero at the steady
state. For αpi, we follow Dittmar, Gavin and Kydland (2005) and set αpi = 1.5.
Concerning the exogenous shocks, we abstract from the government-purchase shock: ξG,t = 0
for all t. We assume that the productivity process follows:
lnAt = ρA lnAt−1 + ξA,t
where ρA = 0.95 and ξA,t is i.i.d. and follows N(0, σ2A). For normalization, we choose σA so that
the standard deviation of output in the model economy with the Taylor-rule policy coincides with
that in the U.S. data. For the risk sharing process, Bt, we consider two cases. The first case is
the one where Bt is constant, Bt = 0.75 for all t. The second case is the one where Bt fluctuates
cyclically. Specifically, we consider the following process for Bt:
lnBt = (1− ρB) ln B¯ + ρB lnBt−1 + σBξA,t
where σB is set so that one percent decline in A reduces Bt from B¯ = 0.75 to 0.7, that is,
σB = (ln(0.75) − ln(0.7)) ∗ 100 = 6.9. This is roughly consistent with the exercises we have done
in Figures 6-8, and seems to be in line with the value obtained in the literature.
***Table 1 is around here.***
Table 1 shows the standard deviation of log output (std(Yˆ ), the standard deviation of the
inflation rate (std(pi)), the correlation coefficient of those two variables, and the autocorrelation
coefficients of each variable for the U.S. data and for several versions of our model. We can see that
15As in the case with efficient steady state, when the degree of risk sharing is constant, i.e., Bt = B¯ for all t, the
optimal monetary policy is roughly equivalent to the zero-inflation policy, regardless of the value of B¯.
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our basic result holds here: First, regardless of whether the steady state is efficient or not, if Bt
is constant over time, the optimal policy stabilizes the price level almost completely (the standard
deviation of the inflation rate is 0.01 percent for both cases). Note that the standard deviation
of output under the optimal policy is greater than that under the Taylor-rule policy. Second, if
Bt fluctuates cyclically, the optimal policy allows inflation to vary significantly, and at the same
time, reduces the variation in the level of output. In terms of the standard deviations of output
and inflation, the Ramsey policy with cyclical Bt seems to generate statistics closer to the data
than the Ramsey policy with constant Bt. This is also the case with correlation: The correlation
between output and inflation under optimal policy is fairly high (about 0.65) when Bt is constant,
but it is close to zero when Bt is cyclical, which is consistent with the data. The autocorrelation of
output is higher in the optimal policy with cyclical Bt, which is, again, consistent with the data.
Overall, we can see that the optimal policy with cyclical Bt generates statistics much closer to the
U.S. data than the optimal policy with constant Bt, both in terms of standard deviations and the
correlation coefficients of output and inflation. Of course, our model is too stylized to compare
directly to the data, but, nevertheless, we find this result interesting.
7. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have considered an efficiency-wage model with the Calvo-type sticky prices
and analyzed the optimal monetary policy when the unemployment insurance is not perfect. In the
standard sticky-price model, the strict zero-inflation policy becomes optimal if the zero-inflation
steady state is efficient. This is because the relative-price distortion is the only distortion in such
a case and such distortion can be eliminated by the strict zero-inflation policy. We have seen,
however, that with imperfect unemployment insurance, the strict zero-inflation policy is no longer
optimal even if the zero-inflation steady-state equilibrium is efficient. Quantitatively, though, if
the level of risk sharing is constant over business cycles, the difference between the optimal policy
and the strict zero-inflation policy is minimal. We have also shown, however, that if the level of
risk sharing is procyclical, that is, if idiosyncratic shocks are countercyclical, as evidence suggests,
the difference can be substantial. Indeed, in such a case, output must be stabilized much more
compared to the case with perfect insurance.
One important limitation of our model is that idiosyncratic shocks are assumed to be purely
temporary. Evidence suggests that idiosyncratic shocks are highly persistent as well as counter-
cyclical.16 Krebs (2007) argues that the persistence as well as the countercyclicality of idiosyncratic
shocks matter a lot concerning the welfare cost of business cycles. Incorporating persistent idiosyn-
cratic shocks is an important direction of future research.17
16See, for instance, Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993) and Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004).
17In our current framework, individuals are not allowed to participate in the asset market, and all the decisions
related to savings are made by the household head. As one of the referees suggested, if we are to keep this framework,
introducing persistence into idiosyncratic income shocks would be roughly equivalent to increasing the variance of
idiosyncratic shocks.
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In addition, our labor market is very stylized and so another direction of future research is to
extend our model in that respect. For instance, we have assumed that a shirker would be punished
by an exogenously-given amount of wage reduction. It might be worthwhile to consider a more
general contract problem with a firm and a worker. Alternatively, it may be interesting to consider
other specifications to generate unemployment, such as search.
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Appendix
Cost minimization problem of a firm





The first equation implies that Cs/Ce = s˜ ∈ [s, 1], where s˜ is defined as the solution to
d(χ− s)(1− s˜) = ω(1− s)s˜(s˜− dω − 1).















Ce,t, where χ ≡ 1− s˜1− s .
Equivalence with a version of Shapiro and Stiglitz’s (1984) model
Consider the following version of Shapiro and Stiglitz’s (1984) model: if a shirker gets caught
she is immediately fired and receives no wages; there are two levels of effort et ∈ {0, e¯}. The rest
is the same as our model in text. Then the incentive compatibility constraint becomes
U(Ce,t, e¯) ≥ (1− d)U(Ce,t, 0) + dU(Cu,t, 0),
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where Ce,t and Cu,t are as given in (4) and (6), respectively. This model and our model become
essentially identical if (i) e¯ is at the level given by (52) and (ii) the unemployment insurance
program is given by
UIft = (1−Nt)shWt, and UIbt = NtshWt.
This is because this insurance program implies Cs,t = Cu,t in our original model.
Derivation of (25) and (28)
To derive inequality (25), note that
∂Y ∗
∂B¯
= − ZY B
UY Y + ZY Y − VY Y
The numeraire is negative, UY Y +ZY Y − VY Y < 0, because of Assumption 1. The denominator is
also negative:











N + (1−N)B ≤ 0,
where the last inequality follows from the assumption that N > 1/2.





σ−1 − δ + φ− 1
(1−N)B¯
N + (1−N)B¯ ≥ 0.
Here, note that σ−1 ≥ 1 and φ ≥ δ.
Derivation of the aggregate-supply relation (32)












where pˆ∗t ≡ ln p∗t − lnPt.
The real marginal cost of firm i is written as
sˆt(i) = (φ− 1)yˆt(i) + (σ−1 − δ)Yˆt − (σ−1 − δ + φ− 1)Yˆ nt
Taking the average over i ∈ [0, 1], the average real marginal cost in period t is
sˆt = (σ−1 − δ + φ− 1)(Yˆt − Yˆ nt )
Log-linearizing the demand function (10) yields




















1 + (φ− 1)θ]pˆ∗t − sˆT +
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Solving for pˆ∗t and writing it in a recursive form, we obtain
pˆ∗t =
1− αβ
1 + (φ− 1)θ sˆt + αβEtpit+1 + αβEtpˆ
∗
t+1 (54)















1 + (φ− 1)θ (σ
−1 − δ + φ− 1)(Yˆt − Yˆ nt ) + βEtpit+1
which is equation (32) in the main text.
Derivation of the welfare approximation (33)
Remember that the household’s flow utility is given by
W(Yt,∆t; ξt) = U(Yt;Gt) + Z(Yt,∆;At, Bt)− V (Yt,∆t;At) + ln(H),
where U , Z, and V are as defined in (21)-(23). We follow Woodford (2003), and Benigno and
Woodford (2003, 2005) to obtain a quadratic approximation of the household welfare.
We denote by Ξ the vector of expansion parameters: Ξ = (Yˆ , ξ,∆1/2−1 ). First, U(Yt;Gt) is
approximated as
U(Yt;Gt) = U¯ + UY Y˜t − UY G˜t + 12UY Y Y˜
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2Yˆ 2t − UY Y Y¯ G¯ξG, tYˆt + t.i.p. +O(‖Ξ‖3)




UY Y¯ + UY Y Y¯ 2
)
Yˆ 2t − UY Y Y¯ 2gtYˆt + t.i.p. +O(‖Ξ‖3)
where gt measures the change in Yt required to keep UY constant:




Next, note that the evolution of ∆t, (31), implies that




















+ t.i.p. +O(‖Ξ‖3) (55)








ZY Y¯ + ZY Y Y¯ 2
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VY Y¯ + VY Y Y¯ 2
)
Yˆ 2t − VY Y Y¯ 2qtYˆt + t.i.p. +O(‖Ξ‖3)
where kt and qt are the change in Yt required to keep ZY and VY constant, respectively:
kt ≡ ZY AA¯
ZY Y Y¯
ξA,t − ZY BB¯
ZY Y Y¯
ξB,t
qt ≡ −VY AA¯
VY Y Y¯
ξA,t
Since the zero-inflation steady-state is conditionally efficient,




UY Y + ZY Y − VY Y
(
UY Y gt + ZY Y kt − VY Y qt
)
It follows that














σ−1(1− Γ)− ζΓ + φ− 1](Yˆt − Yˆ ∗t )2}
+ t.i.p. +O(‖Ξ‖3)
where Γ is defined by
Γ ≡ ZY Y¯
UY Y¯ + ZY Y¯












αθ[1 + (φ− 1)θ]




σ−1(1− Γ)− ζΓ + φ− 1](Yˆt − Yˆ ∗t )2}
+ t.i.p. +O(‖Ξ‖3)
which is (33) in the main text.
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Proof of Proposition 3
For the first part,
c∗G|B<1 − c∗G|B=1 =
σ−1(1− Γ)sG
σ−1(1− Γ)− ζΓ + φ− 1 −
σ−1sG
σ−1 + φ− 1
=
σ−1sGΓ(ζ + 1− φ)
[σ−1(1− Γ)− ζΓ + φ− 1][σ−1 + φ− 1] > 0
because




For the second part, note that
cnG|B<1 − cnG|B=1 =
σ−1sG
σ−1 − δ + φ− 1 −
σ−1sG
σ−1 + φ− 1 > 0
because δ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4
For the first part, note that
c∗A|B<1 − c∗A|B=1 =
φ− Γ(ζ + 1)
σ−1(1− Γ)− ζΓ + φ− 1 −
φ
σ−1 + φ− 1
= − (σ
−1 − 1)(ζ + 1)Γ
[σ−1(1− Γ)− ζΓ + φ− 1][σ−1 + φ− 1] < 0
because σ−1 ≡ 1/(1− sG) > 1 as long as sG > 0. The second part follows from:
cnA|B<1 − cnA|B=1 =
φ− δ
σ−1 − δ + φ− 1 −
φ
σ−1 + φ− 1
= − (σ
−1 − 1)δ
[σ−1 − δ + φ− 1][σ−1 + φ− 1] < 0,
again, because σ−1 > 1.
Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1 follows from
σ−1(1− Γ) + ζΓ− (σ−1 − δ) = δ − Γ(σ−1 + ζ)
= δ − ZY Y









ZY Y + σ−1
{
(σ−1 − δ)[2δ + ln(B)Nφ]− (φ− 1)[− ln(B)Nφ− δ]}
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Proof of Proposition 5






σ−1(1− Γ)− ζΓ + φ− 1 −
σ−1sG
σ−1 − δ + φ− 1 < 0






φ− Γζ − Γ
σ−1(1− Γ)− ζΓ + φ− 1 −
φ− δ
σ−1 − δ + φ− 1
=
(σ−1 − 1)[(1− Γ)δ + Γ(φ− 1− ζ)][
σ−1(1− Γ)− ζΓ + φ− 1][σ−1 − δ + φ− 1]
Remember that
ζ = φ− 1 + δ
2
ZY Y
, and Γ =
ZY Y
ZY Y + σ−1
.
Thus





(σ−1 − 1)(σ−1 − δ)δ[
σ−1(1− Γ)− ζΓ + φ− 1][σ−1 − δ + φ− 1]ZY Y > 0
because σ−1 > 1 because sG > 0 and σ−1 > δ because of (44).
Proof of Proposition 6
Define the quadratic function f(µ) by
f(m) ≡ βm2 −
(










1 + θ(φ− 1)(σ
−1 − δ + φ− 1)
qpi =
αθ[1 + θ(φ− 1)]
(1− α)(1− αβ) (1− Γ)







α[1 + θ(φ− 1)]
(1− Γ)(σ−1 − δ + φ− 1)2
σ−1(1− Γ)− ζΓ + φ− 1
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For µ|B¯<1 > µ|B¯=1, it suffices to show that
(1− Γ)(σ−1 − δ + φ− 1)2
σ−1(1− Γ)− ζΓ + φ− 1 < σ
−1 + φ− 1
Under our assumption,
σ−1 − δ + φ− 1 < σ−1(1− Γ)− ζΓ + φ− 1
It then follows that
(1− Γ)(σ−1 − δ + φ− 1)2
σ−1(1− Γ)− ζΓ + φ− 1 < σ
−1 − δ + φ− 1
< σ−1 + φ− 1
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Table 1: Second-moment properties
(a) The case of efficient steady state
Constant Bt Cyclical Bt
Data Taylor Ramsey Taylor Ramsey
std(Yˆt) 1.50 1.50 1.74 1.50 1.27
std(pit) 1.11 0.66 0.01 0.81 0.35
corr(Yˆt, pit) 0.15 -1.00 0.65 -1.00 -0.10
AR1(Yˆt) 0.86 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.91
AR1(pit) 0.49 0.71 0.42 0.71 0.42
(b) The case of inefficient steady state
Constant Bt Cyclical Bt
Data Taylor Ramsey Taylor Ramsey
std(Yˆt) 1.50 1.50 1.76 1.50 1.38
std(pit) 1.11 0.67 0.01 0.95 0.32
corr(Yˆt, pit) 0.15 -1.00 0.64 -1.00 -0.18
AR1(Yˆt) 0.86 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.90
AR1(pit) 0.49 0.71 0.40 0.71 0.40
Notes: All series are HP filtered. The inflation rates are annual rates. The sample period of
the data is 1960.I-2007.IV. ‘Taylor’ denotes the equilibrium under the Taylor rule, and ‘Ramsey’
denotes the equilibrium under the Ramsey policy. std(x) is the standard deviation of variable x;
corr(x, y) is the correlation coefficient between variables x and y; and AR1(x) is the autocorrelation
coefficient of variable x.
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Figure 1: Optimal responses to a negative productivity shock for different degrees of risk sharing. In each
panel, the solid, dashed, and dash-dotted lines correspond to B¯ = 0.5, 0.75, 1.0, respectively. Note: The
inflation rate is expressed at an annual rate in percentage points. The output gap and the level of output
are expressed as percentage deviations from their respective steady-state values.


















Figure 2: Optimal responses to a negative government-purchase shock for different degrees of risk sharing.
In each panel, the solid, dashed, and dash-dotted lines correspond to B¯ = 0.5, 0.75, 1.0, respectively. See
the note in Figure 1 for the units.
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Figure 3: Optimal responses to a negative productivity shock with ρA = 0.9 (solid line) and ρA = 0 (dashed line).
See the note in Figure 1 for the units.


















Figure 4: Optimal responses to a negative government-purchase shock with ρG = 0.9 (solid line) and ρG = 0 (dashed
line). See the note in Figure 1 for the units.
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Figure 5: Optimal responses to a negative insurance shock. See the note in Figure 1 for the units.


















Figure 6: Optimal responses to a negative productivity shock with cyclical Bt (solid line) and constant Bt (dashed
line). See the note in Figure 1 for the units.
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Figure 7: Optimal responses to a negative government-purchase shock with cyclical Bt (solid line) and constant
constant Bt (dashed line). See the note in Figure 1 for the units.












Figure 8: Optimal responses to a negative productivity shock with cyclical Bt (solid line) and constant Bt (dashed
line) when the steady state is distorted. See the note in Figure 1 for the units.
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